【本期主题】EXECUTIVE GATEKEEPERS: USEFUL AND DIVERTIBLE GOVERNANCE

We study the effectiveness of internal gatekeepers and then ask whether equity incentives divert the attention of corporate lawyers from gatekeeping. We find that executive gatekeepers reduce compliance failures (AAERS and insider trading profits) to negligible levels and decrease securities fraud and uncaught accounting fraud by 43% and 9% respectively. A general counsel fixed effect explains 7% variation in AAERs, and 6% in class action suits, over and above firm, year, and CEO fixed effects. Then, using the assumption that gatekeepers hired from law firms are initially less responsive to incentive pay as compared to those hired from other corporations for identification, we find that equity incentives given to gatekeepers unwind some governance improvements. A one standard deviation increase in gatekeeper’s compensation delta unwinds 82% of the prevention of securities fraud. Gatekeepers do not get diverted, however, from frauds associated with regulatory compliance. We conclude with an alternative interpretation of our design that these gatekeepers-in-residence may be hired as value-creators, but totems of governance.

【报告人】王炜 加拿大女王大学商学院副教授

【时 间】10月27日 上午10:00

【地 点】明德主楼0515B室(汉青交流室)

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报告人简介：

王炜，现任加拿大女王大学商学院金融学副教授（终身教职），杰出金融学研究员。他在加拿大约克大学获得经济学博士学位后又在女王大学获得金融学博士学位。他教授的课程包括公司金融，财务策略，微观经济学原理等。除任教之外，王炜目前还担任中国人民大学-加拿大女王大学金融硕士项目加方项目主任。他的多篇文章在国际顶级学术刊物上发表，其中包括Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Journal of Finance，Financial Management 和Journal of Fixed Income等。 他的研究领域包括：企业破产、财务危机和资本结构。

中国人民大学金融高端论坛组委会

汉青经济金融高级研究院金融系

商学院财务与金融系

财政金融学院应用金融系